From Xenovia LabsIssue 3, October 2026
Secure Enough

Probably fine.

This story is satire. The companies and people in it are invented.

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Ransomware group wins customer service award for a support desk nobody staffs

Judges cited the Lockjaw collective's four-minute response time, empathetic tone, and flexible payment plans. Kevin, it turns out, is a language model.

By Tobias Lindqvist-Ferreira, Chief Panic Officer4 min read

The Lockjaw ransomware collective was named Customer Experience Team of the Year at Tuesday's Tri-County Business Excellence Awards, beating a regional bank, a cable provider, and a chain of urgent-care clinics, two of which it had encrypted in the past eighteen months.

The award recognizes "organizations that go above and beyond to make every customer interaction seamless." Lockjaw's nomination packet, submitted anonymously through a Tor hidden service, highlighted its 24-hour negotiation portal, its median first-response time of four minutes, its policy of decrypting a few sample files for free "so the customer can be confident in the product."

"Honestly, they were easier to deal with than our actual software vendors," said the chief operating officer of Ottoman Empire Furnishings, a victim who spoke on condition that we not use his name and then used it twice himself. "Lockjaw had a chat window open before our IT guy finished saying 'encrypted.' The agent's name was Kevin. Kevin knew our fiscal year end. Kevin knew our insurer. Kevin was lovely."

Kevin, according to a researcher who obtained a copy of the portal's backend, is a language-model negotiation agent. It is handed the victim's stolen files before the first message is sent. From those it drafts the extortion note in the victim's own house style, matching the tone of their internal memos. It triages victims by estimated revenue, cyber-insurance coverage (found in the finance folder), and how recently they tested a backup (found in the IT folder, under "TODO"). It sets the opening demand accordingly, holds forty negotiations at once, and never gets tired, angry, or drunk, which the researcher called "a meaningful improvement on the previous Kevin."

The portal offers tiered pricing. "Standard" includes a decryption key. "Plus" adds a promise not to publish the stolen data. "Enterprise" includes both, a PDF titled "How we got in," and a twelve-month payment plan with a grace period, "because we understand cash flow." Victims who mention their board are routed to a persona called "Kevin's manager," who is also Kevin.

"We treat every victim as a partner in the recovery journey." — Lockjaw negotiation portal, splash screen

Judges noted some concerns. One victim reported that after paying for the Plus tier, their data was published anyway by a different group, which Kevin explained was "an affiliate issue" and offered a 15 percent credit toward a future incident. Another said the decryption tool worked on only 94 percent of files, which Kevin described as "within SLA".

Lockjaw did not attend the ceremony. Its acceptance speech was delivered by a synthesized voice over the venue's conferencing system, which it had been invited to join.

The part that is not a joke

What actually happened

Modern ransomware is a service business, and the service desk has been automated. A core group develops the malware and runs the leak site, the payment portal, and the negotiation front end; affiliates break in and deploy, splitting the proceeds. Language models have slotted into the part that used to be labor: reading the stolen data to price the demand, drafting the note in a register that lands with its reader, running dozens of negotiations in parallel, and keeping the tone empathetic because empathetic converts.

Two things in the satire are drawn directly from life. Double extortion: data is stolen before it is encrypted, so backups alone do not end the leverage. And the affiliate structure: promises made by one party do not bind another, and paid-for "deletion" is unverifiable by design. The bot changes neither; it makes both cheaper to run and easier to pay for.

The affiliates' way in remains dull: an exposed remote-access service with a reused password and no MFA, an unpatched edge device, or a phishing email that lands on a machine with local admin rights.

What to do about it

  • Keep backups ransomware cannot reach: offline or immutable, with credentials separate from your main domain. Test a full restore at least twice a year, with a stopwatch, so you know how many days it really takes. The bot already knows whether you have; make sure the answer is yes.
  • Decide your negotiation position before an incident, with legal counsel and your insurer in the room: whether you would engage, who speaks, what you will never say, and where the line is. A playbook written in advance is the only thing that beats a counterpart with infinite patience and all your files.
  • Assume anything in the stolen data will be used against you in the negotiation, including your insurance policy and your financial position.
  • Remove remote desktop and VPN logins that lack MFA, patch internet-facing appliances first, and segment the network so one compromised workstation cannot reach everything.
  • Report to law enforcement. Free decryptors exist for some strains, the intelligence helps the next victim, and payment to sanctioned groups can be illegal regardless of how helpful Kevin is.
  • Understand what paying buys. It funds the model, the portal, and the next campaign. It buys neither deletion nor a key that works on every file. The chat window is a sales funnel.

About the writer

Tobias Lindqvist-Ferreira

Chief Panic Officer

Tobias calibrates the panic meter and covers ransomware, fraud, and the people who make a comfortable living from both. He is calm in a way that colleagues describe as unsettling.